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1 INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomic policy poses a particular set of difficulties for those who would pursue the 
politics of economic reform. Interventions to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation focus in the 
first instance on shifts of macroeconomic prices, such as ‘the’ interest rate, ‘the’ exchange rate, 
the inflation rate and ‘the' wage rate. The need to alter these prices (or their rates of change) is 
linked to a strong and coherent theoretical logic' and can be implemented through fairly 
straightforward administrative processes by those with authority over government finances. At 
the same time, however, such macro price reforms are something of a blunt instrument with 
uneven distributional consequences They require skilled political management, the standard 
view being that the winners need access to their gains rapidly so that they can be mobilised to 
support the reforms politically, while the losers either need to be compensated or else 
neutralised politically.
These arguments underlie the predominant view of the political conditions for economic reform, 
summarised by John Williamson and Stephan Haggard in their synthesis of sixteen eountry 
case studies^ They suggest that the most important pre-requisites of successful reform are 
firstly a coherent economic team, and secondly a political leadership which is willing and able 
to insulate the team from political pressures, in other words, a party which possesses both 
“vision" (that is, the long-term perspective required to back the economic reform proposals 
notwithstanding possible short-term political costs) and a strong political base (that is, a party 
which is dominant). Specific economic circumstances (macroeconomic crisis) or political 
circumstances ("honeymoon’ for a new government) can also help.
In other words, this approach advocates the exclusion, or at least restriction, of politics, for 
fear that demands from various groups in society will compromise policies based on sound 
economic analysis Or, to be more generous, the politics required is that o f ‘selling’ the 
economic policy after its formulation, that is. politically managing its implementation.^ As Dani 
Rodrik has pointed out, the “fundamental fault line (in debates about the politics of economic 
reform) is the issue of how participatory reform politics ought to be. Most economists arc on 
the side of speed, stealth and consequently reform from above” "
But it is now widely accepted that this form of centralised state action involving total autonomy 
from society) applies only to macroeconomic stabilisation, the inilialion of the reform process 
To sustain macroeconomic stability requires a second phase of reforms on both sectoral and
macro dimensions involving a markedly different process with far more complex administrative 
and institutional demands The emphasis is on shifts in relative prices and in production 
structures, including public sector reform to reduce fiscal deficits through improved 
productivity in service delivery, improved tax collection and greater allocative efficiency in the 
budgetary process This second stage of reform’ also encompasses a wide range of state 
activities such as labour market regulation, competition policy, market regulation and so on It 
is characterised by disparate and uneven processes involving significant decentralisation of 
authority, multiple theoretical and analytical bodies of knowledge and skills, and an interactive 
rather than insulated relationship between reformers and interest groups, since successful 
reform requires heavy flows of information and active co-operation and negotiation. Political 
management in other words is not concerned with mediating between winners and losers, but 
with adjustment and flexibility^
It is somewhat paradoxical that the institutional and political approach seen to be necessary for 
the first steps in reform may well be entirely inappropriate for the subsequent process aimed at 
the sustainability of reform. A second paradox emerges from the view that macroeconomic 
stabilisation is best initiated by a team, or rather, an insulated politician backed by a technical 
team, with a high level of discretionary power. Yet the weight of macroeconomic theory in the 
1990s suggests that 'rule-based' policies are most likely to produce sustained macroeconomic 
stability, by preventing politicians within a democracy adopting destabilising (that is, 
excessively expansionary ) macro policies in the effort to win voter support. But since reform 
requires a high level of political will, it raises the question of whether the ‘rules’ and 
constraints to be implemented to sustain the course once it has been corrected, should continue 
to rely on the political will of 'far-sighted' individual or teams of policymakers, or whether 
(and how) they should be institutionalised and de-personaliscd.
The view of politics implicit in the Washington consensus has worrying implications for 
democracy and its consolidation, at least for those versions of democracy which incorporate a 
dimension of pluralism. Critics of the benevolent dictatorship’ view argue that the necessary 
centralisation and unity of purpose required for the state to direct reforms can be achieved by 
actively engaging in a political process with the aim of constructing consensus, or at lest 
negotiated agreement, amongst interest groups in relation to economic policy reforms This will 
be more likely to contribute not only to democratic consolidation, but also to the sustainability 
of the reforms themselves.* If political interests do not allow themselves to be excluded, that is, 
if the process does not mimic a benevolent dictatorship, then govenunent could be forced by
political pressures to abandon the refonns, or amend them, with possibly greater damage to 
investor confidence than if the reforms had not been adopted in the first place.’
Given the weakness of the state characteristic of many societies which have recently made the 
transition to democracy, there may be no ‘choice’ available in resolving this paradox - political 
and institutional circumstances may impose a particular pattern of centralised state action, 
which may turn out to hamper democratic consolidation (as well as not be effective in 
introducing and protecting macroeconomic policy reform). Thus the paradoxes identified 
above offer little comfort to critics of the ‘Washington consensus’ approach They cannot 
ignore the force of the ‘rules’ perspective and accept full discretion in macroeconomic policy, if 
only because of the impact on investor credibility and confidence of doing so. This poses the 
problem of reconciling ’rules’ and the democratic process.
This paper examines SA’s macro reforms and their relation to growth strategy, in the light of 
the debates and paradoxes identified above I suggest that South Africa has not implemented 
macroeconomic reforms in a way which combines macro stability effectively with democratic 
consolidation My starting point is that macroeconomic policy reform in South Africa was 
initiated in 1989 with the objective of stabilising inflation, though not explicitly as part of a 
comprehensive reform programme or growth strategy Since then, macroeconomic reform has 
proceeded along an uneven non-linear path. While monetary and exchange rate policy have 
maintained a consistently austere approach and have been successful at least in lowering 
inflation, fiscal policy rcfomi was erratic and sporadic until 1993, when serious attention to the 
fiscal aggregates began. The inauguration of the Interim Constitution in 1994 forced a greater 
focus upon fiscal processes, because of the requirement for a new system of intergovernmental 
relations “ Understandably, given the transition, growth strategy has been extremely unsettled 
Three distinct frameworks - the NEM, RDP and GEAR - followed each other in fairly quick 
succession between March 1993 and June 1996. GEAR placed macroeconomic austerity at its 
centre and further emphasised outward orientation and a reconfigured relation between the 
private and public sectors, so that in a sense it completed, or at least signalled the intention to 
complete, the policy reform process initiated 7 years earlier
Section 2 examines the first round of macroeconomic reforms between 1989 and 1993. In 
section 3 ,1 look at the manner in which ‘insulation’ of economic reform was managed during 
this period, when tripartism emerged out of macroeconomic policy reform. Section 4 discusses 
the ANC’s commitment to the reforms which had preceded the establishment of the
Government of National Unity Section 5 looks at the GEAR (Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution) strategy announced in June 1996. Section 6 concludes.
2 MACROECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS 1989-93
As with many other countries, the 1970s and 1980s had been characterised in SA by lower 
growth and higher inflation GDP growth dropped from 5.5% per aimum in the 1960s to 3 3% 
in the 1970s to 12%  in the 1980s. From 1974 to 1989, the consumer price index in South 
Africa rose on average 13.6% per annum, and never dropped below ten percent.’ SA was 
evidently a moderate inflation economy"’ in which expectations had adjusted to an annual 
inflation rate in the 10-20% range, and there was considerable inertia in the process.
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Through the 1970s and 1980s. there had been much rhetoric but little action amongst SA 
policymakers about the costs of inflation and its threat to growth. Monetary and fiscal policy 
had been subordinate to political concerns, as two anecdotal examples suffice to illustrate. In
1984, the ruling National Party faced possible defeat by the extremist Conservative Party 
(which had broken away from the NP in 1982) in a by-election in a white working class 
constituency near Johannesburg. Although macroeconomic circumstances required no change 
in interest rates, the government prevailed on the then Governor, Gerhard de Kock, to lower 
rates. The by-election duly being won by the government, the RB once again increased interest 
rates." Similarly for fiscal policy: "in March 1988, as part of a great PR campaign against 
inflation, [then President] PW Botha pledged to hold public servants salaries static for a year 
A rise was announced 6 months later.” (FinancialMail, October 20 1989)
Exchange rate policy during the 1980s until 1988 was oriented mainly towards offsetting the 
impact of changes in the dollar gold price and stabilising the real rand price of SA’s main 
export earner and other primary commodities. This resulted in a fluctuating nominal exchange 
rate, but overall depreciation When ‘financial sanctions’ were imposed on SA in August
1985, as international creditors recalled outstanding loans, the exchange rate depreciated 
further. The need to run current account surpluses to finance the capital outflows for the 
purpose of debt repayments affimied existing exchange rate policy, and the rate of inflation 
was allowed to tick upwards By 1988. growth was beginning to improve and adjustment to the 
debt crisis seen as complete
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Macro policy attention now shifted to inflation which declined in 1987, but was nonetheless 
considerably higher than SA’s major trading partners Tliis was seen to be a problem, given the 
debt repayment situation and the medium-term need for a current account surplus In 1988, 
monetary policy was tightened (the benchmark bank rate rose by 5 percentage points) and the 
Reserve Bank switched its focus to stability of the real exchange rate rather than the real gold 
price
The tighter policy did not seem to be effective as money supply growth aecelerated in 1988 and 
inflation began to rise again in early 1989, reaching a high of 15.7% (year-on-year) in June 
1989, with the quarter-to-quarter rate doubling from 9.2% in 1988:1 to 18.4% in 1989:2.’’ 
Though arguably less of a problem than the three- or four-digit inflation rates which 
precipitated reform elsewhere, this was regarded as suffieiently serious to warrant a 
fundamental shift in orientation, whieh occurred when Chris Stals was appointed Governor of 
the SA Reserve Bank in August 1989. In his Governor’s Address to the Bank’s Annual 
Meeting a few weeks after his appointment (possibly the most important occasion of the year), 
he announced that “the main emphasis of monetary poliey has been switched to the curtailment 
of inflation’’. It soon beeame apparent that “the goal of the Bank’s efforts had been narrowed to 
that of maintaining the value of the curreney”''*, that is, lowering inflation and maintaining a 
relatively stable nominal exchange rate. This, the Bank argued, was “the best eontribution it 
[was] eapable o f making to long-term real economic growth’’.'* An interesting refleetion on the 
Reserve Bank’s poor credibility at the time was that the rate rise in October 1989 was seen to 
take the financial markets by surprise, despite several warnings by Stals that he planned to take 
the action
It is worth noting though that the Bank’s time horizon for lowering inflation to the level of 
SA’s trading partners was 4-5 years, and also that an important factor in the initiation of the 
new approach was that favourable prospects for maintaining a current account surplus enabled 
the downward pressure on the rand to be eased It was felt that a more stable rand would 
squeeze profit margins forcing wage cuts (or lower increases) and easing cost pressures, so that 
exchange rate policy would support monetary poliey."’ Interestingly, this argument was 
advanced at the same time that government and the trade unions were engaged in a major 
eonfrontation over the Labour Relations Amendment Aet, where government intentions were 
clearly to restructure the wage bargaining process to facilitate downward pressure on wages.
It appears that there was a co-ordinated view favouring reform within government at the time, 
an informal committee’ involving the key economic policymakers in the state having been 
initiated by Stals in 1989 {Finance Week, July 16 1992) This co-ordinated view included a 
commitment to fiscal adjustment, even though the deficit in 1989 was well below the medium- 
term guideline' of 3%. Fiscal reform thus focussed at the outset on re-prioritising spending, 
together with reducing the tax burden. The decision, made in 1990 on the advice of the IMF, to 
replace the GST with VAT during 1991 was an element of the latter, together (curiously) w ith 
lowered import surcharges and rates on dividend and interest income. Individuals’ tax rates 
were further adjusted to eliminate the impact of fiscal drag, presumably in anticipation of lower 
inflation W
These reforms did not amount to a comprehensive or coherent programme, nor were they 
announced as such Nonetheless, it was evident that at least at the outset there was a coherent 
reform team’ in place By embarking on a macroeconomic reform programme with a medium- 
term perspective on success, at more or less the same moment that it was also initiating the 
normalisation’ of political life through its release of prisoners and unbanning of organisations, 
the government was demonstrating its confidence in its capacity to manage a political transition 
and retain power. This confidence was fundamentally misplaced. But the government’s efforts 
to manage the macroeconomic reform programme politically nonetheless had a significant 
impact on the transitional process, while the reforms’ economic legacy persists.
The direct consequences of the reforms are reflected in the data for 1989-93 presented in Table 
I Interest rates were raised through 1989 and 1990, before beginning to drop in 1991. 
Although the rand's nominal effective rate continue to depreciate, up until 1993 it was doing so 
at a much slower rate than before. As the Reserve Bank had predicted, two decades o f double 
digit inflation had resulted in well-established expectations and a high level of inertial inflation 
The CPI actually increased in 1991, and it took nearly four years of contractionary policies 
before the rate dropped to single digits. In the meantime, demand compression was reflected in 
a rapidly dropping investment rate, and negative GDP growth rates from 1990 through 1992 
This had predictable effects on employment, which also shrank
3 THE WEAK STATE: INSULATION AND TRIPARTISM
Table I also shows that up until 1993, fiscal policy provided only limited support for the 
monetary authorities. Indeed, in 1992 and 1993, the deficit really ballooned upwards, 
producing a rise in government debt and thus higher levels of debt service commitments in the 
years since. These differential outcomes for monetary and fiscal policy were closely related to 
the relative ability of the respective policymakers to be insulated from political and social 
pressures. There was a marked difference between the Reserve Bank and the Department of 
Finance in this respect, related to institutional location together with a weak executive in the 
conte.xt of the political transition process. Notwithstanding the National Party’s own 
assessment of its capacity, it was a weak governing party without political dominance, with a 
fragile base and inevitably with a short-term perspective, given the transitional situation and its 
tenuous hold on power
Wliile this enabled the Bank to be more insulated, it meant that the Finance Department was 
less so, and more subject to pressures. The Reserve Bank Governor was not a member of the 
cabinet, and the Bank used the opportunity of a weak executive to increase its relative strength 
within the state. From the time of Stals’ accession, the Bank promoted greater independence for 
itself, on the basis of arguments which used the model of the German Bundesbank to make the 
link between increased central bank independence and lower inflation.
Stals’ himself commented on this a year after his appointment: “I have yet to be approached by 
politicians with any unreasonable demands for premature easing of monetary policy” and gave 
two explanations: “First, SA’s political system is in transition. It resembles the second term of 
the US presidency |sicj when the Fed also tends to enjoy less political interference. Secondly, 
the international debate over the independence of central banks”. {Finance fVeek, August 9 
1990) Of course, one important difference between the South African transition and the second 
term of a US president is that the institutions of the state, and the Constitution, are not in 
substantial flux in the latter case The Reserve Bank was able to extend the debate about its 
independence into the constitutional negotiations, and the outcome was a clause'* in the new 
Constitution securing its independence from government It would appear that the Bundesbank 
continued to be the prototype for this clause, which is quite vague in specifying the content and 
limits of this independence, as well as the nature of the accountability of the bank and its 
Governor. The ‘international debate’ to which Stals refers in fact regards the Bundesbank 
model with some ambivalence: Stanley Fischer, Deputy MD of the IMF, refers to “the German 
model making the Bundesbank accountable to the public” and suggests that while this 
“approach may work, nonetheless, precise accountability to elected officials is more likely to be
effective than vague general accountability.”"' And Wolfgang Streeck refers to the Bundesbank 
as a ‘semi-sovereign state’ which "considers its [pre-announced) monetary target to be non- 
ncgotiable, with the federal government or anybody else. .. it is precisely the policy’s credibly 
established non-negotiability - and the implied rejection of any trade-off with other objectives, 
in particular full employment - which is regarded by the bank as its most important condition 
of success.
Given the importance of the big business’ constituency to FW de Klerk, and their support for 
Reserve Bank policy as well as its shift to a more independent stance^', it would probably have 
been impossible for de Klerk to impose a different policy on Stals, despite the economic 
contraction which clearly affected the National Party’s support. But it is also true that there 
was less public pressure on monetary policy than on fiscal policy, despite the evidently greater 
impact of the former on the disastrous output and employment performance o f the economy at 
the time. There was no public campaign against high interest rates in the early 1990s, for 
example: was this perhaps because the high rates didn’t hit the poor directly as they were not 
direct borrowers from the banks?
The Department of Finance on the other hand was unable to resist mounting pressures for 
higher spending These were linked to several aspects of the transition: the declining ability of 
the state to exclude blacks from the rights of citizenship led to demands for racial equality of 
pensions and other measures for poverty alleviation; the National Party’s concern to 
consolidate and expand its political base was reflected in higher civil service salaries; and the 
difficulties of establishing normal’ political life led to rapid increases in police spending, 
offsetting any savings in the military budget resulting from the suspension of ‘official’ armed 
struggle The treasury’s inability to control the fiscal aggregates was already evident in the 
1990/91 Budget, notwithstanding the establishment of an extra-budgetary fund in the form of 
the Independent Development Trust ^  ^The appointment of a non-politician, Derek Keys, as 
Minister of Finance in June 1992 promised more than could be achieved in terms of fiscal 
deficit reduction, as the 1993 data in Table I reflect
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The differential degree of insulation between the two key institutions responsible for 
macroeconomic policy fractured the coherence of the economic team. By mid-1991, the 
Department of Finance and the Reserve Bank were publicly bickering over each other's 
policies - the bank complaining about the growing fiscal deficit, and the Department responding 
that the reason for this was real interest rates that were unnecessarily high. (Business Day,
August 7 1991; Finance Week. June 20 1991) Incoherence in the policy team continued to 
bedevil reform initiatives up to the transitional election in 1994. Most revealing of this was the 
release by two government agencies of only partially consistent documents presenting a 
“Normative Economic Model” in early 1993.’^
The inability of government to insulate the Department of Finance not only resulted in the 
growth in the deficit, but also contributed to the emergence o f tripartite structures in economic 
policy, with the establishment of the National Economic Forum in October 1992 in the wake of 
the conflict over the introduction of VAT. Government aimounced in 1990 its intention to 
switch to VAT from GST and at the same time eliminate the zero tax rating of a wide range of 
basic food s.T h is  led to a mass public campaign led by a very broad coalition dominated by 
COSATU, but including support even from consumer bodies and welfare organisations 
primarily serving the white population The coalition succeeded in forcing the government to 
introduce VAT at a lower rate than initially planned, thereby significantly affecting the size of 
the deficit in 1991/2
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The anti-VAT campaign was seen by the trade unions as having a broader objective: it was 
“also a demand for a macroeconomic negotiating forum”. I n  making this demand, explicit 
parallels were drawn with both the NMC, the statutory tripartite labour market regulator which 
the unions had joined in 1990, and with the ongoing political negotiations in CODESA. Though 
government resented the pressure, de Klerk complaining that the trade unions were attempting 
to “introduce interim government by stealth”*, it was unable to resist the demands, especially 
when business joined the unions in the call The government's acceptance of the NEF was 
facilitated by Derek Keys, the businessman turned Cabinet Minister, and thus arguably more 
comfortable engaging with popular organisations than a regular National Party politician
While the establishment of tripartism was self-evidently a watershed in the politics of economic 
policy formulation in South Africa, it is again noteworthy that the union-led campaign for the 
NEF was characterised by a curious lack of engagement with macroeconomic policy narrowly 
defined, and in particular with the day-to-day orientation at the time of monetary and exchange 
rate policy .’  ^Instead the focus of criticism over political prerogative and systemic change was 
fimily on ‘long-term' economic restructuring, such as the reform of indirect taxation. This 
pattern might be explained by the conjunction of the establishment of tripartism and the 
constitutional negotiations which of course focussed specifically on such longer-term and 
structural issues.
Perhaps because of this feature of its origins, negotiations over (narrowly-defined) 
macroeconomic policy has not really become established as part of tripartism in South Africa 
None of the NEF agreements are concerned with these issues The discussion which was 
closest to macroeconomic concerns, the debate over the Normative Economic Model, was 
buried' in a technical committee of the Long-term Working Group, itself very much the junior 
of the two Working Groups. Macroeconomic policy discussion has of course taken place In an 
early example. Keys "reportedly made a presentation to the [NEF] ...in November 1992 on the 
worsening budgetary situation, and largely convinced parties that 1993/94 could not be a year 
for substantial fiscal stimulus.’’*^
This has been the pattern: rather than focussing on reaching agreement, as has been the case for 
discussion of policy in other areas (labour markets, trade and industrial issues), 
macroeconomic policy discussion within the tripartite context has mvolved the government 
sharing information to win support for its own position and stance, rather than negotiating a 
position and explicitly making trade-offs with the ‘social partners’ In a sense this has assisted 
the process of insulation of macro policymakers: they are able to assess likely reactions to 
proposals, but retain much greater autonomy to decide whether to adjust them in light of the 
reactions, than if a negotiated agreement were the objective. The approach to other issues has 
been characterised by joint formulation and even implementation of policy: as far as the NEF is 
concerned, in the 1993/94 Budget, allocations were made to the NEF and the National Flousing 
Forum to implement projects, while the Forum’s role in formulating the GATT offer is 
discussed elsewhere.’’
With the establishment of NEDLAC as successor to the NEF in 1994, Budget proposals have 
continued to be presented to NEDLAC’s Public Finance and Monetary Policy Chamber ' The 
consideration of the 1996-97 Budget followed a unique approach as compared to the general 
agreement-making function of NEDLAC The parties to the Chamber characterised the 
discussion as an exchange of information and views, while acknowledging that the Ministry' 
of Finance remains solely responsible for the Budget and how it is presented” ’”
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4 THE ANC AND MACROECONOMIC REFORM
When it took office as the dominant partner in the GNU, the ANC inherited an economy that 
had been stabilised, with inflation down to 9.7% in 1993, and growth picking up from the 
second half of 1993, after four years of recession. The capital account o f the balance of 
payments turned around m the wake of the first democratic election as inflows were positive for 
the first time since the 1985 debt crisis. South Africa quickly joined the ranks of “emerging 
markets”, a perhaps dubious privilege given the volatility of international capital flows, as SA 
would discover two years later. The ANC could be regarded as fortunate perhaps that 
stabilisation o f the price level had been undertaken prior to the election, so that it did not have 
to manage the political consequences of falling output and especially employment (assuming 
that the inflation rate did indeed have to be brought down through austere monetary policy). On 
the other hand the macroeconomie reforms which had been carried out prior to 1994 meant that 
the ANC’s hands were effectively tied - the reforms had “created a new largely irreversible 
reality that |the| successors dared not touch”’' for fear of losing credibility and destroying 
private sector confidence
However the ANC had already shown an understanding of the issue of credibility and had 
furthermore accepted that it was necessary for private sector investment to lead the growth 
process, and that this investment would be forthcoming only in an environment characterised 
by fiscal discipline. Speaking in late 1991, President Mandela had indicated
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the SA economy is in decline Measures must be taken to ensure that it grows. These 
must include a sharp rise in the rate of investment, the growth of the domestic market, 
the growth of exports of manufactured goods, the raising of skill levels to increase 
labour productivity . redistribution of wealth . and the creation of opportunities
including through affirmative action to ensure black empowerment..... the private
sector must and will play the central and decisive role in the struggle to achieve many 
of these objectives. . .let me assure you that the ANC is not an enemy of private 
enterprise...we are aware that the investor will not invest unless he or she is assured of 
the security of their investment The rates of economic growth we seek cannot be 
achieved without important inflows of foreign capital. We are determined to create the 
necessary climate which the foreign investor will find attractive.”
Mandela’s sentiments were further confirmed by the acceptance of the clause in the 1993 
Interim Constitution relating to the independence of the Reserve Bank This implied at the same 
time that Chris Stals would continue to be Governor: there was little purpose from the point of
view of credibility in accepting the clause and then replacing him with (to investors) an 
unknown quantity In any event, the clause itself made little difference to the operation of the 
Bank and monetary policy, since it was sufficiently vague that the relation between government 
and the Bank would continue to depend de facto on the personal styles and relationship of the 
Governor and the Finance Minister
We will return to this point below. But it is worth noting that there was division within the 
ANC on the ‘independent central bank' clause^’, though the issue was not thoroughly aired, 
even amongst ANC economists, before the position of the leadership (in favour of the clause) 
was adopted in the negotiations And ANC support for this position was reiterated by President 
Mandela just before the elections: “We argued for the independence of the (Reserve) Bank 
when this issue was discussed at the constitutional negotiations. We did so not only because we 
are committed to tlie sound economic management of the country, but also because we want to 
send out a strong signal to the international and local business and financial communities that 
we arc serious about this commitment
This difference of view, and its resolution, was interesting in presaging later more intensive 
debate within the party over the GEAR strategy, when the leadership similarly managed the 
process to secure their vision, that is, the reforms
The re-appointment of Derek Keys as GNU Finance Minister in 1994 (and a few months later 
his successor Chris Liebenberg. like Keys a businessman rather than politician) was similarly 
intended to demonstrate the ANC 's acceptance of the macroeconomic reforms carried out in the 
last few years of apartheid rule But even prior to the election, the ANC had negotiated jointly 
with Keys and the outgoing government, a loan agreement with the IMF for $850 million.^’ The 
agreement was eventually concluded in November 1993 during the period of (official) interim 
government and was thus signed by the Transitional Executive Council of which the ANC was 
of course a part. The “Statement of Economic Policies” which was attached to the loan 
agreement strongly affirmed a continuation of the e.xisting macroeconomic stance:
an easing of monetary policy would have risked a further undermining of confidence 
and a resurgence of inflation . . . tlie thrust of SA’s monetary policy during the past year
will be maintained.... despite the pressures for additional expenditure that will arise in
transition, there is widespread understanding that increases in the government deficit 
would jeopardise the economic future of the country.... Given the importance of
maimaining a coinpctili\c lax slruclurc. it llUcal polic) | will aiiphasisc cxpcndiluru 
containment rather than raising taxes
It was theoretically possible that the ANC could have chosen to renege on these policy 
commitments after the finance had been made available (as has occurred elsewhere). But to 
renege on such a commitment could have had very high costs, not only economically but also 
politically, where it might have precipitated pre-emptive action by various ‘reluctantly 
democratic’ groupings. On the economic side, the new government would have been sharply 
reminded of the possible costs by the collapse of the (net) forex reserves during the first half o f 
1994, before the switch in capital f lo w s .In  addition, there was a rise in government bond 
yields in September 1994.^* Thus the ANC was clearly committed to (if not unified in) support 
for the macro reforms introduced prior to the election This is worth underlining not to suggest 
that this position was incorrect - as noted, the ANC “dared not touch” the reforms - but rather 
to emphasise the consistency in the ANC’s position on macro policy between 1993 and 1996, 
or between the RDP and GEAR, GEAR in other words did not represent the abandonment of 
the RDP or a rightward shift, as many have suggested^’
This understanding is borne out by an examination of the RDP itself that is, of the structures 
put in place to implement the RDP Thus the RDP Fund*’ was set up within the parameters of 
the announced government target of keeping its consumption expenditure constant in real 
terms: the approach was to leverage’ a reprioritisation of expenditure by cutting line 
departments' budgets and forcing them to re-apply for the funds to spend on “RDP-oriented” 
projects, rather than increasing total spending to make room for these projects The point here 
IS not that this was a rather clumsy approach to re-prioritisation, as many commentators have 
noted."" What is important rather for our purposes is that the approach to the RDP Fund rested 
upon fiscal discipline And relevant ANC cabinet ministers reiterated their commitment: as 
Alec Erwin put it in October 1994: “The strict adherence to fiscal discipline is designed to 
achieve critical transformatory objectives [in the RDPj. The purpose of fiscal discipline is in 
the first instance to bring about a reprioritisation of state expenditure, an improvement in 
certain macroeconomic relationships and by these means to place the public sector in a better 
position to manoeuvre the economy in a manner that promotes equitable growth,
Furthermore, the RDP Office was set up within the executive in a way that allowed it very 
restricted influence over fiscal policy, and no influence over monetary issues or other aspects of 
macro policy. In other words, macro policymakers were effectively insulated from the RDP and
especially from those social groups whose (justifiable) demands for improved access to public 
goods and services might have overwhelmed well-intentioned political leaders.
5 THE GEAR STRATEGY
The starting point for GEAR was the increasingly held view that the RDP and its associated 
programmes were not going to be sufficient to increase growth and job creation from the 
improved but still disappointing performance of the SA economy. The microeconomic 
programmes and policies assembled under the RDP label, covering small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMMEs), public works projects, land reform and infrastructure development, were 
working, to be sure, but too slowly to have any significant medium term impact. What was 
needed in addition, it was felt, was a mocroeconomic intervention to accelerate the process. 
Fiscal expansion was ruled out from the start, given the commitment to maintain control over 
the fiscal aggregates, of course, but there was general agreement that the rand had become 
significantly overvalued This was despite the fact that the Reserve Bank had shifted in 1992 to 
a policy of maintaining as far as possible relative stability in the real exchange rate.'*’ 
Substantial capital inflows during 1995 (see table 1) had slowed the depreciation of the 
nominal rate relative to the inflation differential
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Key policymakers had therefore decided an exchange rate devaluation was necessary before the 
rand's initial drop in February 1996, though there was little certainty about how to manage this 
either technically or politically .** A devaluation was of course a standard pieee of the 
'Washington consensus' package but so was a stable nominal rate under circumstances where 
inflation was seen to be the more pressing problem Notwithstanding its own (apparent) policy, 
selling a devaluation to the Reserve Bank might not be easy, given the risks of the exchange 
rate adjustment sparking inflation, which would also neutralise the impact of the policy by 
eroding any temporary competitive improvement
As it turned out, “selling” a devaluation proved unnecessary - the financial markets decided for 
themselves that the rand was overvalued and the nominal effective rate dropped by Ik. 1% 
between January and July 1996 '** The policy focus shifted to restoring credibility amongst 
investors, particularly financial investors, with the purpose of stemming the currency ’s decline 
and especially the associated switch in capital flows: net capital inflows of R11 2 billion in the
second half of 1995 dropped to inflows of R2.7 billion in the first half o f 1996 With the drop 
in the reserves, following the earlier drop in 1994, something of a sense of crisis emerged.
With the planned policy intervention no longer necessary, there was no action around which to 
structure the policy framework, so that the publication of the strategy document itself in June 
1996 became the focus. Rather than introducing a more innovative strategy, this document 
was essentially a re-affirmation of the commitment to macroeconomic austerity, that is to the 
reforms which had already been carried out, together with an assembling of policy measures in 
other spheres that govenunent was planning or already actively implementing.
Thus g e a r 's fiscal policy reduced the existing deficit targets (spelled out by Finance Minister 
Keys in 1994) by 0.5% of GDP per annum: the target was now 4.5% in 1996/97, dropping to 
3.0% by 1999/2000, while also specifying a ceiling on the share o f GDP taken by tax revenue 
of 25%. Thus government’s total resource envelope was determined. Monetary policy identified 
both lowered inflation and a stable real effective exchange rate as objectives, but with no 
specifics about mflation targets or how possible tradeoffs between the two might be managed. 
GEAR also reiterated government plans to introduce ‘phase 11’'“  reforms to enhance the 
sustainability of the macro reforms These include increasing efficiency in revenue collection 
and financial management, and budget reforms to improve expenditure planning and control, 
and to re-prioritisc spending
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Aside from its macroeconomic dimensions, GEAR also re-affirmed government eommitment to 
enhanced inteniational competitiveness in a more open economy. Tariffs would be reduced 
faster than the commitment to the World Trade Organisation (WTO); production costs lowered 
by flexible application of employment standards and labour cost adjustments; the forex market 
liberalised in a gradual process; and investment tax incentives introduced to encourage 
investment in internationally competitive and labour-absorbing projects, and to boost SMMEs. 
Finally, GEAR re-iterated the ‘microeconomic’ policies which were already being implemented 
but whose effects had been adjudged too slow. These included privatisation, social 
infrastructure investment, SMME support and land reform.
The immediate aim of the GEAR strategy was to signal to potential investors the government’s 
(and specifically the ANC s) commitment to the prevailing orthodoxy. In “marketing” the 
strategy, senior Department of Finance officials made explicit its close parallels with the 
approach of the international financial institutions, while emphasising at the same time the idea
that GEAR was “home-grown” in SA *” The hope was that this would lead to increased 
investment sufficient to attain the specified targets of a GDP growth rate of 6% per annum and 
400 000 new jobs per annum by the year 2000
An essential difficulty with the strategy adopted in GEAR quickly became evident To improve 
its credibility, a government needs to make a cosily commitment to its policy stance. The South 
African government did not immediately undertake any action to implement GEAR, other than 
the announcement itself of the strategy. Nor does GEAR incorporate any sanctions or other 
costs to the political leaders, should the commitments (and targets) not be met. Thus there was 
no cost associated with the government expressing commitment to its policy stance, and for this 
reason it was not immediately seen to be credible. This accounts for the slow and cautious 
response by investors to GEAR It was only when the government began to undertake specific 
actions late in 1996 and early in 1997 - providing persuasive evidence prior to the Budget that 
it would meet its deficit target for the year, announcing the partial privatisation of Telkom, 
announcing in the Budget speech the further liberalisation of exchange controls - that capital 
inflows (both portfolio and direct) began to piek up. During the first three quarters of 1997, 
capital inflows not related to changes in the reserves rose from the 1996 level of 0.7% of GDP, 
to 4.2%. In the second quarter, the figure was 8.7% of (quarterly) GDP. Not surprisingly, the 
‘little bang’ of exchange control liberalisation in July 1997 turned out to be hardly a whisper
But whereas the government could validly claim that financial investors, domestic and 
international, were persuaded (for the moment?) of the credibility of the policy stance, the same 
could not necessarily be said of investors in productive capacity: gross domestic fixed 
investment picked up only marginally to 17.3% for the first two quarters of 1997 (1996: 
17.2%), before sliding to 16.9% during the third quarter. GDP growth for 1997 was expected 
to be only between 15% and 2%, well off both the 1996 figure (3.1%) and GEAR target for 
1997 (2 9%) It appears that building a reputation which can convince investors considering 
longer-term commitments is a slower and more complex process than persuading the financial 
markets of one's case
Close affinity with the 'Washington consensus’ characterised not only the substantive policy 
recommendations of GEAR, but also the process through which it was formulated and 
presented publicly. In fact, the GEAR strategy was almost a textbook case of the conventional 
wisdom in the politics of economic reform It was drawn up in somewhat secretive conditions 
by a small team of economists, in the context of a currency crisis which was dramatic by SA
standards, if not in global terms. The document was published after only the most cursory 
consultation within the ANC, with its allies in the trade unions and the Communist Party, or 
with interest groups in society, and Finance Ministry officials stressed their unwillingness to 
subsequently negotiate any clement of the strategy. This was ‘reform from above’ with a 
vengeance, taking to an e.xtreme the arguments in favour of insulation and autonomy of 
policymakers from popular pressures. This stance served of course to increase the temperature 
of the debate between the ANC leadership and popular groups and organisations within its 
political base, a debate which has focussed on process at some cost to the consideration of 
substance.
The political leadership has basically relied upon party loyalty and discipline together with its 
own leadership skills to secure support for, or at least compliance with, the GEAR strategy. 
After 18 months of often tense and difficult debate, which occasionally broke out into the 
public arena, they finally established a firm position within their own party, 
reflected in the endorsement of the current economic policy stance at the ANC’s December 
1997 conference. The use of the internal processes of a political party to insulate state 
authorities from opposition to policy reforms does not appear to have been common in 
comparative experiences, where the interaction between the ruling party and opposition parties 
is more often the focus, and tlie capacity of leaderships to maintain control over members 
assumed.'**
On the one hand, that a position which started out as extremely unpopular has now won full 
organisational support, is a tribute to the leadership skills deployed by the ANC. On the other 
hand, it remains something of a puzzle as to why the strategy of refusing to engage in public 
debate over the GEAR strategy was adopted, and what was gained from this stance and from 
using party loyalty and discipline to enforce it It can be noted that it was the lack of immediate 
policy action within GEAR which enabled such approach to insulation to be followed, since 
almost any intervention would have had to be publicly discussed and in some form negotiated 
w ith affected groups While this absence of action did enable the government to avoid 
consultation, it is not clear, as noted earlier, that it enhanced credibility with investors and 
thereby contributed to the success of the strategy. Furthermore, when actions were taken later 
which contributed to GEAR’S credibility, such as the Telkom privatisation, they were indeed 
more widely canvassed, though they were not specifically presented as elements of GEAR
The irony is that if a devaluation of the rand had been neeessary, as was originally envisaged, 
negotiation would have been required with the very groups who were later most unhappy with 
their exclusion from consultation, namely the trade unions. In fact the economic logic of a 
devaluation suggested that it would have been necessary not only to persuade the Reserve Bank 
to loosen monetary policy, but also to try to put in place an incomes policy to mitigate the 
possible inflationary consequenees. The survival of a chapter on a “national social agreement” 
in the published version of GEAR was a vestige of this thinking But the market-led 
depreciation allowed, indeed required, a tightening of monetary policy through the course of 
1996, which in turn helped to keep inflation down and made incomes policy no more than 
marginal to the overall thrust of GEAR, even at the time of publication Nonetheless, that an 
incomes policy was even contemplated, which would have required complex negotiations and 
difficult tradeoffs (with business as well as labour), makes it harder to understand why the 
choice was made to eschew a broader process
One possible explanation for the tactics used to insulate GEAR is linked to the view that the 
state is ‘infrastructurally w eak' as a result of the nature of the transitional process, that is, the 
state has limited ability to make policy decisions ands implement them by “making alliances, 
subordinating vested interests...om/gaining popular acceptance for its proposed solutions.”*’ 
Even though the state has the institutional resources, in the form of NEDLAC, to engage in a 
consensus- or agreement-oriented process involving consultation with interest groups, 
NEDLAC had perhaps not yet shown itself able to deal effectively and quickly with processes 
which promised to be difficult and involve tough trade-offs As noted earlier, negolialion over 
macroeconomic policies has not been a feature of NEDLAC nor of its predecessor, the NEF. 
Given the sense of crisis which permeated the formulation of GEAR, the government was 
perhaps not prepared to take the risk of impasse or breakdown of a tripartite process. Instead it 
preferred to insulate its policy programme by relying upon its ‘despotic power’, that is, the 
ability to govern w hile remaining entirely autonomous of society, some degree of which is 
retained even by a relatively weak state.
6 CONCLUSION
Even if the ANC conference decision - to broadly endorse the government' economic policy - 
leads to more debate in future (in NEDLAC or elsewhere) over the detail of GEAR, it seems 
unlikely that GEAR itself would be amended, as opposed to an entirely new policy framework 
being constructed. The integrity of GEAR itself has been maintained by means of the
executive’s strategy of firmly protecting its autonomy. It is even possible that the ‘resolution’ 
of the conflict over the strategy which was accomplished at the ANC’s December conference 
might produce an improvement in the programme’s credibility and a positive impact on fixed 
investment.
o
The implications of the methods used to manage the politics of macroeconomic reform remain 
of concern, however South African monetary and fiscal policy is leaning towards adopting for 
the long haul what might be labelled the “German” model of macroeconomic policy 
institutions. As noted earlier, this involves the setting of targets by macro policymakers 
themselves, the insistence on the non-negotiability of tliese targets, and only vague and general 
accountability ‘to the public'. This model essentially relies on ‘leaders with vision and 
determination’ to determine the appropriate policy stance. In other words, policy depends on 
the individual styles of the incumbents, rather than on institutional mechanisms. The content of 
the constitutional clauses dealing with the central bank’s independence, the politics of GEAR’S 
implementation, the Reserve Bank Governor’s recent rejection of calls for more open 
discussion of monetary policy” , the ‘special status of macroeconomic policy debate within 
NEDLAC, all strongly reflect German-type arrangements.
It is true of course that the Bundesbank has an enviable record amongst policy institutions for 
meeting its objectives However, the Bundesbank has a long-established reputation and is part 
of an extremely powerful state within a consolidated democracy The South African state, and 
South African democracy, are rather more fragile. South Africa may have more to gain from a 
different approach to institutionalising sustainable macroeconomic policies, what might be 
called the “New Zealand” model. This weighs much more heavily the need for consultation, 
accountability and decentralisation in the formulation and implementation o f ‘rule-based’ 
policies. It allows for greater flexibility in response to exogenous shocks, which seems crucial 
as long as global capital flows continue to be as substantial and as volatile as at they presently 
are. Perhaps most important, this approach seems to offer more promise in terms of enabling a 
self-reinforcing combination of macroeconomic policy reform and democratic consolidation, 
that is a democratic and participative process to devise ‘rules’, to which policymakers can 
commit, together with mechanisms of accountability for executive performance in adhering to 
the rules
TABLE 1: BASIC MACROECONOMIC DATA
19 8 8 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1. Real GDP growth' 4.2 2.4 -0.3 -1.0 -2.2 1.3 2.7 3.4 3.1
2, Investment Rate3 19.8 20,6 19.6 17.8 16.6 15:5 16,1 16.9 17,2
3. Budget deficit" (National government) 4.4 4.3 3.2 4.9 9.3 10.1 5.7 5.7 5.4
4, Primary suiplus" (National govemment) 07 0.2 -0,8 0.5 :;y:;:::.4;4:: : 4:9 O.I -0.1 -1,1
5. PSBR" 4.0 2.1 4.5 5 4 9.6 10.4 6.0 6.1 5.9
6; Cturaitaecount'l-deficit) 1.7 14 19 20 1.5 1.6 -0.3 -2,1 :: -1.6
7. Capital flows" (+ net inflow) -3.2 -1.4 -0.6 -0.7 -1.4 -4.0 1.0 4.0 0.7
8. Change in net reserves’ -1,5 0.0 13 13 0,7 19 7 -0.9
9. Weeks of import cov er (at year-end) 6.1 5.5 5.6 7.2 7.6 6.5 6.8 7.0 5.6
10. Nominal effective e.vchange rate (1990=100) 114.7 103.3 100.0 94.0 89.5 81.2 73:77::: 69.5 7 60.5
11. Real effective exchange rate (1990=100) 95.8 95.4 100.0 103.0 104.8 100.2 97.1 97,4 89.4
12 Gold Pncs(US$, 1990=100) 114,0 99 5 100,0 94.4 89 6 93.8 100,1 100.2 io i:i
13. Bank rate (average for year) 11.8 16 8 18.0 17.2 15.4 12.9 12.3 15.3 15.8
14. Inflation' (CPI) 12.9 14.7 14.4 15.3 13,9 9.7 90 87 :,7y'i:7,4
15. Real interest rate -1.1 2.1 3.6 1.9 1.5 3.2 3.3 6.6 8.4
10, M3' : : 27.3 22.3 120 12.3 8.0 7.0 15.7 15.2 13,6
17. Employment' (formal sector) 1.9 0.8 -0.3 -1 » -2.0 -2 1 -0.6 0.7 -1.1
18: Average real wages' (private sector) 27 -0 6 0 0 07 1 5 0 1 1 4 25 1.8
NOTES:
1. Percentage change
2. Share of GDP
3. Fiscal years: 1989 refers to April 1 1989 - March 31
4. Flows unrelated to resen es
1990
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